This paper examines the difficulties of finding local solutions to the problem of contentious events in contemporary Northern Ireland. In so doing, it offers a sociological perspective on fundamental divisions in Northern Ireland: between classes and between communities. It shows how its chosen case study -parades and associated protests in north Belfastexemplifies the most fundamental problem that endures in post-Agreement Northern Ireland, namely that political authority is not derived from a common civic culture (as is the norm in western liberal democracy) but rather that legitimacy is still founded on the basis of the culture of either one or the other community. Haugaard's reflections upon authority and legitimacy are used to explore Northern Ireland's atypical experience of political conflict visa-vis the Western liberal democratic model. And the Bourdieusian concepts of field illusio and doxa help to explain why it is that parading remains such an important political and symbolic touchstone in this society. 
This paper begins from the premise that the enduring problem of stalemates, standoffs and street violence around commemorative events in Northern Ireland is a symptom of its ailing political system. We will argue this through a detailed examination of the case study of the annual Twelfth of July Orange parades, and protests at these parades, through the predominantly Catholic area of Ardoyne in North Belfast. This has been a contentious event since the early 1970s, and, despite some progress in the mid-2000s and persistent efforts at conflict-prevention, it remains arguably the most predictable occasion and place for serious street level violence and communal conflict in Northern Ireland. Indeed, because this event is widely seen as a weatherglass for community tensions in wider society, political and community leaders on both sides use the Twelfth of July parades through Ardoyne as a signal occasion for setting the limits to compromise. We have chosen this phrase carefully because we note that the overarching tenor and tone of all political discourse around these contentious events is one of defiance. Whilst, in the lead up to the Twelfth, elite-level actors (including the Parades Commission) place a heavy emphasis on the vital role for local-level negotiation and accommodation (see below), we argue that any such efforts at finding a local solution are inextricably hamstrung by the social realities of post-Agreement Northern Ireland.
In sum, in the current political climate, the efforts towards managing (and even resolving) conflict around contentious events such as the Twelfth of July parades through Ardoyne are given no legitimacy. Instead, the norms, values, discourses and practices that predominate around these events are those that reinforce the conditions for conflict or, at the very least, direct communal opposition. Thus, we explain how the events on one portion of one street in Belfast on one day embody the legacy of conflict and the enduring problem of trying to find compromise in Northern Ireland.
Layers of division
The absence of a shared civic culture Legitimacy and stability are conferred on any political system by its civic culture. 2 Cultural power transmogrifies into 'the natural order of things' and thus the use of direct confrontation to maintain social order in most modern societies is exceptional. The locus of power has moved from external forces to internalised restraint. 3 And in western, capitalist cultures, power is experienced not as conflict but as competition, within the logic of which those with less power are made to accept their actions 'are constitutive of the power of the powerful'. 4 In these democracies, the healthiest forms of political power are perceived to be those that are most limited and refined by the effects of this perpetual competition in all aspects of society. 3 The key to creating such a stable, non-(overtly)coercive society is legitimacy. Legitimacy is a social process but is closely tied to political authority. 5 Authority itself is a consequence of a status position which is itself given only when the performance of the person with authority matches expectations, as defined within his/her social field. 6 And so Haugaard describes the ultimate ideal of political power in western liberal democracies as seeming to transcend the necessary internal oppositions and to 'surf the waves of competition, fluidly and malleably' whilst ensuring that they do no harm. 7 If we consider now the situation in contemporary Northern Ireland in this light, we immediately see a major problem. When we attempt to draw ties between political authority and civic culture, we see that political status and social expectations are judged differently according to different political communities (social fields) -it is thus very rare for political leaders to be seen as authoritative across Northern Ireland society. Cultural power works within communities to create a stable system of social order, to shape social norms and values and to construct expectations of political performance. In a 'healthy' society, 'social actors have multiple interpretative horizons available to them as part of their everyday social practices'. 8 But in a divided society, the capacity to choose from these interpretative horizons is constricted, both in terms of discourse and in terms of socially-acceptable behaviour. These constraints on 'interpretation' are more acute for social actors whose other horizons (material, educational, vocational) are also heavily constrained. 9 For this reason, the class divide in Northern Ireland is best described in terms of a 'detached' and 'particularized' habitus, rather than as 'middle' and 'working' class (see below). 10 Haugaard contends that, in a modern liberal society, 'with the complex detached habitus goes ease and a sense of entitlement to politics while with the particularized habitus goes a feeling that politics is not for us'.
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The post-Agreement environment This is not quite true of a divided society such as Northern Ireland, which is in a process of transition from being a society in which political power was overwhelmingly in the domain of one ethnic group, through to one of an over-politicised society (in which few aspects of social conditioning were removed from political contestation), to one of consociational agreement.
The 1998 Agreement paved the way for a political system that centred on elite power-sharing; fifteen years on, the middle class luxury of being able to make a decision about whether to become politically engaged contrasts with the working class experience, i.e. having no choice about being directly affected by political conflict but yet having limited power to change it. This is, it must be noted, much more of a minority experience -confined to and largely constituted by, the local spatial and socio-economic character of particular areas 12 -than it was during the Troubles, but it helps to explain why those with a particularized habitus in Northern Ireland are more likely to experience the 'politics is not for us' sentiment in terms of a rejection of the Agreement itself, be it in the form of dissident republicanism or protesting loyalism.
If the pathway out of conflict in Northern Ireland is generally approached as being one of growing mutual understanding and respect, the assumption is that there must be recognition of the legitimacy of different 'interpretive horizons' held by its various communities. However, it is still the case that, for many, 'interpretive horizons' different to that of one's own group are seen as posing a direct challenge to that group. This, it has been argued, is because, although the Agreement sought to give parity to different political aspirations and cultural values in Northern Ireland, it simultaneously centred on a conceived binary which posits two communities in fundamental tension with one another (British/Unionist/Protestant/Ulster Scots v. Irish/Nationalist/Catholic/Gaelic). Although it is the case that some cultural identities do not fit comfortably with other political aspirations (e.g. Ulster Scots with Nationalism), it is not the case that one cultural identity automatically means that a particular political aspiration will be held (e.g. Gaelic with Irish Nationalist aspiration for a united Ireland).
Nevertheless the strength of the binary is such that Northern Ireland's future is in suspenseheld in tension between the Unionist and Nationalist power-holders -and the resulting sense of communal insecurity means that few have the confidence to be open to (let alone to explore) an 'interpretive horizon' associated with the 'other' community. Actors, particularly political and community leaders, are therefore most confident in remaining within their singular interpretative horizon, and one which is, for all intents and purposes, in opposition to another.
Aughey describes the situation thus: 'Here is a mythological imagination which tends either to overestimate the potential of one's own side -an exercise in hubris -or to overemphasise the demonic potency of the other side -an exercise in paranoia'. 13 In addition to such effects of the consociational political milieu, there are more immediate reasons why there is worse polarisation of community identities among the 'particularized' class. For instance, there is a lack of acquaintance with different ways of making sense of the world, especially for those in underprivileged areas. Means by which other 'horizons' are opened up and contact is made with diverse groups of people -through residential mixing, university education, career progression, travel, etc. -are far less likely for people in such areas. Instead, much social experience (in school ethos, neighbourhood, community activity, for example) serves to reinforce an interpretative horizon/group identity that is not only fairly singular but that is also seen as being made more vulnerable by the strength of another community. 14 The social processes behind this identity are the same in all particularized communities, but the discourses and practices which define this collective identity are very different according to the community in question.
Community identity as a site of struggle
The specific social conditions of an individual give rise to a system of dispositions (or habitus) in which certain social practices become like second nature, and help to seal membership of a wider social body. 15 Hillier and Rooksby observe that habitus is ultimately 'a sense of one's (and others') place and role in the world of one's lived environment' and that it is 'an embodied, as well as a cognitive, sense of place'. 16 In Bourdieu's understanding of habitus social space translates into physical space and thus helps to demonstrate that there is a mutually constitutive relationship between the politics and culture of a democratic public sphere and the constitution of space. 17 This centres upon what he terms the 'field' in which the individual resides -the product of social practices and networks which are largely spatially bounded and which, together, give a sense of a community united in a struggle for resources and recognition. 18 There are two critical elements needed for a 'field' to be fully integrated and united: illusio (investment and interest in this shared social struggle) and doxa (the tacit rules followed by all actors in the field). 19 This theoretical framework helps illuminate some of the factors at work in grassroots polarisation (and disaffection) in contemporary Northern Ireland. In the context of transition out of conflict, and in the circumstances experienced by those in the less fortunate 'particularized' classes, membership of a field, defined around a clear political-cultural identity, holds greater import. Individuals, therefore, may invest particular effort in the collective 'struggle' of their field for resources and recognition, either in terms of interest or in actual engagement. Related to this, membership of the field is characterised by holding certain field-specific resources; in this case, these resources are most likely to be in the form of social or cultural capital as defined within that field. And this brings us back to the reason for the exaggeration of difference and the reaction of violent protest to matters of particular symbolic significance to the culture (field), such as contentious events.
The circumstances in which the contested legitimacy of the Agreement is most evident are around matters of high cultural symbolism, such as the flying of the union flag on City Hall or an Orange parade through a predominantly 'Catholic' area. It has long been recognised that shared symbolic acts reinforce group solidarity and a sense through bolstering commitment to a shared set of beliefs and practices. 20 More than this, they solidify (and even themselves create) collective memories that are drawn upon by the community across time. 21 There are wider dangers in this process in a modern liberal democracy. As Lukes notes, the shoring up of a sense of social cohesion through ritual occasion by one group can occur at the expense of another -it reflects a broader power tussle. 22 Similarly, Koster claims 'the ritual impulse' in modern, multi-ethnic states can give rise to the danger of 'exclusion, stigmatization, conformity and the marginalization of dissent'. He stresses the aggressive totalitarian potential of 'ritual space' for the emotional experience of collective identity which 'excludes both individual differentiation and the symbolic presence of other tribes'. 23 To elaborate:
Koster sees severe ethical risks arising from the role of ritual in the modern state specifically because when ritual performance takes to the streets it can intensify the collective experience of identity in relation to territory. 24 This is clearly evident in the case of Northern Ireland, where the connections between local territory and collective identity are so strong. Not only are parades -and the related conflict -heavily territorialised (e.g. a parade can be contentious because of its route), public disorder is most likely at the boundaries of 'communal territories' in heavily segregated urban areas. But for those directly involved in the protests and acts of social disruption -if they are on the basis of defence of a collective identity and ideology -these experiences create the effect of further alienation from the institutions of law and order, plus a growing intensity of group identity. We see in the emotional energy created by participants in these instances of public contestation in post-Agreement Northern Ireland the reinforcing of group solidarity and the production of a particularized cultural capital 27 -both of which serve to deepen communal divisions.
To return briefly to Haugaard's description of a healthy liberal democracy:
Legitimacy is the key to creating a system that is stable, where observable coercion is the exception, never the rule. This entails elites using discourse to legitimize decisionmaking.
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In Northern Ireland, we see observable coercion around contentious events for three main reasons. First, elite discourse is used to legitimise conflictive community positions (based on the doxa of the social field) and to challenge the decisions of the formal institutions charged with managing the event (i.e. the Parades Commission and the PSNI). As a result, these institutions of state order are perceived to lack both legitimacy and authority. Second, elite power-holders are becoming skilled in working out compromises in the form of a carving up of benefits (risking making this a 'shared out' rather than 'shared' society, as Prime Minister
Cameron put it). 29 But the political environment this creates makes it even more difficult to find compromise at the local level around matters that appear to pose a proximate threat or that are given particular cultural and symbolic importance. Third, the alienation of 'particularized' groups (i.e. ones most directly affected by the risk of violence, or who see themselves to have lost the most by the Agreement) is expressed less through the ballot box than through on-street demonstration.
The site of contention

Twelfth of July parades through Ardoyne
There are approximately 4000 parades held in Northern Ireland each year (this has grown in recent years; of these, around five per cent are contentious). 30 In terms of what makes a parade 'contentious', we note that it can be both the event/persons being commemorated 31 per cent of adults have no or low qualifications. 32 Added to all these acute difficulties is the sense of isolation felt by a community surrounded by Protestant majority wards (Ligoniel, Woodvale, Shankill, Glencairn). Despite the fact that these areas, too, suffer significant levels of deprivation, the experience is not seen as 'shared' with Ardoyne but instead community members believe themselves to be competing against the 'other' community for scarce resources and recognition. 33 This sense of isolation is exacerbated by the starkness of segregation and the strict spatial and experiential lines of community division. 34 Thus, Ardoyne epitomises the 'particularized' community described above: material, cultural, and social horizons are heavily localised and confined within the spatial boundaries of the field. protests as well as to parades) and the events were policed by far fewer police officers in, as one interviewee put it, 'high viz jackets and white shirt sleeves' rather than riot gear. As one negotiator on the loyalist side told us:
And that was the community taking responsibility for the situation on the ground. And it was amazing to see such a positive effect that we had on the ground as a result of our face-to-face negotiations. And it was a marvel to watch and to be part of because previously you would have seen these very, very violent scenes and then we had almost an outbreak of peace. And it was fascinating to be part of. should negotiate with in order to avoid trouble, it also became increasingly wary that there was growing pressure within Ardoyne to push for no compromise. More destructively, it argued that CARA no longer had the 'wherewithal to reach an accommodation' and prevent violence and therefore used this as a reason not to engage in talks with them. 38 The year of 2010 saw a public and visible demonstration of this fragmentation, when the GARC members organised a sit-down protest on the Crumlin Road. The images of the protest before and after the police set in to move them generated a message spread immediately around the world that all too obviously contrasted Sinn Féin's carefully judged argument in favour of cooperation with the reformed police service. The riots in the area after the evening parade was through went on for four days. In 2011, the tactic of GARC changed, and they Thus, the greater forces of tension within unionism (particularly around political representation) the greater the significance given to the symbolism of the parades. This is relevant because the crisis of leadership in unionism that has deepened since the Agreement is most acutely felt at the edges of the influence of the mainstream parties, i.e. in working class areas. 40 One interviewee claims that the gap between unionist elected representatives and ordinary working class people has widened to the point of it almost being at an end. He claims, 'people are so disenfranchised, disempowered now that they feel as if they're probably the lowest rung of the social ladder if you are living as Protestant in a working class area'. 41 This sense of disempowerment is very prevalent in the protests at rerouted parades 42 - and it is no coincidence that these tend to be in interface areas.
The emphasis upon local accommodation
Although a number of Orange parades had long been problematic or contested, intercommunity disputes over parading achieved their high level political significance in the mid1990s. This was a consequence of the move from ceasefires to negotiations, during which time unionism sought to emphasise its equality in cultural terms and nationalism sought to emphasise its equality in terms of human rights. The response of the British government and security forces to the problem of contentious parades was to encourage local accommodation between the parties directly concerned in order to reach a 'mutually acceptable compromise'. 43 The North Report on parading formalised this approach, seeing the desirable outcome as being 'local accommodation', with legal rulings, and heavy security enforcement, only the last resort. 44 This approach was reiterated by the Quigley Review of the functioning of the Parades Commission, which argued that the trend towards local accommodation should be accelerated in order to 'provide a process whose outcomes are achieved within a framework which is transparently fair and recognised as such'. 45 Quigley's report was submitted less than a month before the Assembly was suspended for a period of almost 5 years, so it not surprising that his recommendations were not officially responded to by the Executive or by the government. In place of that, the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee in
Westminster held its own review of the Parades Commission and its report, too, emphasised that:
The fundamental function of the Parades Commission is to facilitate local solutions to parading problems. The involvement of the Commission itself is a necessary 'half way house' to encourage and develop local solutions to local problems. 46 This remains the principle upheld by the Parades Commission itself, as reiterated in determinations on contentious parades through Ardoyne:
we hope that all local political representatives, clergy, community activists and those persons of influence will use their influence to reduce the potential for violence and to enhance the potential for robust, durable and good community relations. 47 And the police also rely heavily on these processes of local negotiation in the lead up to contentious parades and protests. As a senior officer commented:
The fact that we have committed people on both sides of the community here ringing each other and who try and work with each other and with the police to try and resolve tension is beyond invaluable.' 48 However, even the fact of communicating closely with the police or crossing the street to meet a representative from the other 'side' makes considerable demands of local level players;
we now turn to elaborate why this is so, bearing in mind that these various reasons all, ultimately, centre upon the fact that the conditions for community level cohesion and compromise around these contentious events have not been fostered by the working out of the 1998 Agreement. One community worker goes so far as to say that this essential aspect of building peace was entirely neglected in the construction of the Agreement:
I think the British and Irish government and to a lesser degree the American government had their focus on the political architecture... and they made a mistake by applying themselves and their resources into the political institutions and left the peace process to manage itself in many ways. So for organisations, such as our own, we are very much carrying the can, in many ways, of preventing the conflict from slipping back. 49 He argues that grassroots organisations have neither the resources nor the capacity (including secure popular backing) to deliver 'local level solutions' to problems that relate to the deepest forms of division in Northern Ireland. This points to a bigger problem around coming to agreement or compromise in post-Agreement Northern Ireland. The negotiations around contentious events are not only about managing conflict but about the broader challenge of managing change; as one interviewee argues:
So it's not just a case of managing conflict all the time or per se but it's about managing change as well in terms of the overall process. And that's not easy for a lot of communities because a lot of things are changing and people can feel vulnerable or people can feel nervous or people can feel elated. And it's also about how that change is managed both in communities and between communities. 50 The next section of this paper examines the ways in which negotiations around Twelfth of July parades and protests in Ardoyne, as well as being a symbolic exercise of power and identity, 51 reflect these problems of inter-and intra-community legitimacy and power relations.
The local negotiations
Jarman et al. find three main approaches to local accommodation: exploratory engagement (talks about talks), indirect engagement, and formal non-public engagement. 52 The Parades
Commission has featured quite heavily in the first two types of engagement around contested parades/protest in Ardoyne. For example, indirect engagement has occurred through 'shuttle mediation', with the Parades Commission sometimes working to communicate concerns of the residents to the Orange bands, and vice versa. The most advanced form of negotiationformal non-public engagement involving confidential discussions between the representatives of key parties -has been used quite frequently around contentious events but with certain qualifiers. First, the occasions for the most advanced formal liaisons between key local players are typically 'just a couple of' multi-agency meetings held fairly close to the event to ensure shared knowledge of the plans for protesting and policing. 53 Our research included observation of such meetings and it is notable that these were held in separate venues (i.e. either in one community or the other), within a few weeks of the Twelfth; that they centred around practical concerns about minimising the risk of public disorder and damage to property (either through police tactics or through riotous behaviour); on information rather than negotiation; and there was a sense that it was too late to avoid the risk of violence altogether. Those meetings that do involve negotiations between community representatives are not generally publicised because of overt opposition within the unionist political community to engagement with community level republicans (despite the power-sharing arrangements in the Assembly and Executive in Stormont). Moreover, it has been particularly difficult to get official representation from the parties concerned to formal talks, mainly because of the view of (a) the undesirability of compromise (given the broader conflict context described above) and (b) the negotiating partners.
We, thus, return to the discussion of legitimacy. One PSNI interviewee comments that the police tend to 'talk through with the legitimate people what the policing operation is gonna look like and to prepare them for what it's going to be'. 54 This hints at a problem with multiple and disjointed (mis)recognitions of who has the legitimacy to speak on behalf of whom in such negotiations. A fundamental problem for the legitimacy of those negotiating around contentious events is that many political representatives gained significant capital from criticising the Agreement and power-sharing arrangements. 55 Furthermore, whilst many appear willing to divert responsibility for negotiations around totem issues into the hands of 'non-representative' organisations. This correlates with the wider trends of alienation from political leadership in 'particularized' communities most affected by these contentious events;
as noted above, this is most acutely felt in unionism. Mitchell notes that this 'lack of legitimacy manifests itself in the distance mainstream unionism places between itself and former combatants', which leads to a greater emphasis on local accommodation (thereby keeping political hands metaphorically clean). 57 In practice, political leaders of the unionist parties are hamstrung by the fact that they neither want to be associated with loyalism (as a political. 58 In the case of negotiations around contested parades, then, authority generally takes two different forms: it is delegated to negotiators on the part of the Orange bands and to representatives on the part of the protestors (not only through Sinn Féin but also through residents' collectives who may act as a front for other political republican organisations). In effect, though, negotiators tend to be former combatants on both sides: 'these are people who were sworn enemies and who were prepared to kill one another in a previous period of time'. 59 What brings them to this position is both their community activism and the respect
given to them for their demonstrated commitment to the local community; they have strong credentials in terms of adherence to the illusio and doxa of their field. The interviewee here is keen to emphasise his negotiating rights as a resident and gives the impression of being a reluctant leader, but for the sense of duty to speak on behalf of residents otherwise inhibited and voiceless. This framing of his negotiating position as, first and foremost, a concerned resident is done not so much to reassure his negotiating counterparts, or the Parades Commission, as to draw a thread of legitimacy more grounded in the local community than the (dissident) republican group, increasing gaining prominence in protests at parades through Ardoyne.
The fear of compromise
This leads to the related issue of risks posed to the negotiators from within their own community. Wolff has argued that conflict can be significantly exacerbated by intracommunal diversity. 62 One of the greatest difficulties faced by workers engaged in crosscommunity work is that of maintaining support from within their own communities. 63 Even the mere willingness to negotiate can be subject to contempt, not least because it implies acceptance of compromise. 64 Thus, both sides of negotiation become beholden to domestic constituencies, vulnerable to pressure and possible sabotage by extreme positions, with the accusation of 'selling out' being the most easily cast. Our interviewees from both 'sides' freely mentioned the pressure they felt from their own communities because of misperception and distrust of the intentions of the other and the risks posed by compromise. 65 In both constituencies, against the wider background of uneasy agreement, the issue of parades can be used to destabilise not only the peace process but also the position of political representatives.
Thus, each community representative or political leader willing to engage in negotiations around the issue of parading needs to assess the likely risk posed: For republican negotiators, the particular challenge is that the fact of liaising with the PSNI, the Parades Commission and (even indirectly) the loyalist negotiators representing the marchers, confers a certain legitimacy on these bodies and a clear responsibility to follow through the agreed recommendation. One interviewee notes that this is a major downside of the capacity to negotiate for republicans. 66 For loyalist negotiators, the intra-community tensions are also highly evident and have a severe debilitating effect on the willingness to compromise. This is eloquently described by one of the interviewees negotiating on the other side:
The people who negotiated with us were primarily the UDA and the UVF and a couple of representatives from the bands. And they were sitting there. And any compromise that was going to come around -the UDA was looking at the UVF, they were looking at each other to see who was gonna compromise first or who would be blamed for losing the Twelfth march on the Crumlin Road. So we were always in a situation where someone's gonna end up getting blamed for this and is UDA gonna be the ones who sold out or is UVF gonna be the ones who sold 'cos nobody else was doing the business in the room. 67 In addition to the tensions within the closed negotiations is the fear that the ramifications of compromise will be seriously exacerbated not just by the media but by local politicians themselves. 68 Nobody wants to be associated with compromise on these matters of cultural significance. That this is a major concern -and that it can be generally assumed that any concession will be roundly criticised -reflects back on the lack of a shared civic culture and the lack of a culture of compromise in post-Agreement Northern Ireland. The dividing up of resources and recognition in this society thus becomes translated back to the dividing up of time and space in the contested event on the day. In this context, those charged with finding local accommodation around a contested event that has been given immeasurable cultural significance for the community, have cause to doubt whether there is any serious political will among those in the 'detached' political class for finding agreement:
It's no good twenty of us sitting down at a 
Conclusion
In this paper we argued that the enduring problem of stalemates, standoffs, confrontations and street violence around contentious parades and protests in Northern Ireland is a symptom not only of its ailing political system but a sign of a lack of common civic culture in Northern
Ireland society where legitimacy and political authority are still derived exclusively from within, rather than across communities. Here cultural power has worked to create stable 'particularised' classes who are necessarily constrained in their interpretation and available repertoires for reaction to contentious events. Such classes are embedded in separate fields, which is to say that members are assumed to participate in a shared social struggle (illusio) and to conform to particular, localised norms and rules of behaviour (doxa). These notions help to explain contemporary grass-root polarisation in Northern Ireland, in the context of which commemorative contentious events and protests perform the ritualistic function of solidifying and consolidating group cohesion, stressing and re-embedding territorial definitions of community.
Whilst, in the lead up to contentious events, elite-level actors place a heavy emphasis on the vital role for local-level negotiation and accommodation, there is currently little evidence that those at the highest levels of power in Northern Ireland really do believe they have more to lose than to gain from the perpetuation of conflict around this symbolic demonstration (be it through parades or protests) of community identity. Arguably, such events have helped 
